In this work, an intellectual property (IP) licensing framework is proposed that is secure against IP theft (cloning and redistribution). This security is provided by utilizing built-in features of modern field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), e.g. secure boot, state-of-the-art cryptography and trusted execution environments (TEE). The scheme is also the least restrictive in comparison to other publications in this area. Using this scheme, multiple IP core vendors (CVs) can configure their IPs remotely by connecting directly to an FPGA. Devices are booted securely using an authenticated and encrypted boot loader that initiates an authenticated and encrypted hypervisor, which in turn provides a TEE by partitioning the system resources into secure and non-secure sections. At this stage, a secure operating system (OS) is loaded that handles all the security critical functions such as communication with CVs, storage and analysis of bitstreams, enforcement of license constraints and configuration of IPs. Then, a second, non-secure OS is loaded, which provides an isolated execution environment with unrestricted access to non-secure resources. Hence, they are not limited to predefined APIs. Both OSes can interact via the hypervisor. The implementation of this framework is a work-in-progress and results presented within this paper are subject to change.
INTRODUCTION
Production costs for integrated circuits (ICs) are the key cost factor for low-volume applications. Programmable devices like FPGAs can be a cost effective alternative in such cases. With recent advances in technology, these devices are offering enough resources to accommodate even large designs, making them suitable for a variety of industrial applications.
FPGAs are programmed using a digital bitstream that can be easily distributed independent of the physical device, which makes FPGAs an ideal platform for circuit trading. For example, system developers (SD) can outsource the development of parts of a circuit to or license them from third parties, who might be more experienced in a specific area. This kind of approach can reduce development costs and give system developers an edge over their competitor in performance but also in time-tomarket. Such licensable circuit designs are called intellectual property (IP) and are sold by a core vendor (CV). In general, they can be delivered in different digital formats like register-transfer level (RTL) code, netlist or bitstream. However, RTL and netlist representations need to be integrated by system developers during development and thus must be in a readable format, offering no protection against extraction of the original design. Bitstream, on the other hand, are processed directly on an FPGA, without direct access by SDs. Therefore, they are comparatively more secure against reverse engineering (RE), as they can be distributed in a proprietary format that is only known to the FPGAs themselves. Since this resilience against reverse engineering is only based on obscurity through the proprietary format, extraction of information is still possible with enough effort. Furthermore, all of these formats are vulnerable to overuse and redistribution.
In response to these problems, modern FPGAs offer several built-in security features, i.e. an internal decryption engine and a secure hardware key vault, so that bitstreams may be delivered in encrypted form and only be configured on an FPGA that stores the corresponding decryption key.
However, programming the key into a device also causes several problems. If SDs perform this task, they get access to any IP, exposing them to overuse or redistribution. Similarly, if a specific CV programs the key, it would mean that either only their IPs could be used (as only, they know the key) or that all involved CVs have to agree on one key, which in turn creates more security problems, i.e. a CV can access another CVs intellectual property. Additionally, it would introduce the logistical overhead of sending devices to the CV.
To cover these problems, this work provides a detailed investigation of existing licensing and remote configuration approaches. Their security and feasibility issues are discussed and a method for a secure licensing infrastructure with remote configuration capability is derived.
IP Licensing
Typically, multiple entities are involved in the secure delivery of intellectual property. Throughout this paper, the following naming conventions are used, which are common among related works in the area of IP licensing and remote configuration: FPGA Vendor (FV): Producers of FPGAs and system-on-chip (SoC) devices. These products are commercially available with necessary documentation and development tools and can be used as off-the-shelf products. 
Remote Configuration
Remote configuration, in the context of IP licensing, refers to the process of a CV remotely accessing the device of an SD and configuring their IPs into it. This direct access reduces the number of steps required in the process of acquiring an IP and makes the licensing scheme's implementation easier. Since IPs are configured on the device without further processing, they must be in the bitstream format. However, in the absence of appropriate security features, overuse of the IP cannot be prohibited. Therefore, a suitable licensing framework needs to be present to provide CVs with measures against threats like cloning, reverse engineering, redistribution and tampering. Since both remote configuration and IP licensing, are dependent on each other, we will treat them holistically rather than individually. Consequently, a secure IP licensing methodology will be proposed and then a remote configuration capability will be added on top of it.
RELATED WORK

IP Licensing
IP Licensing and remote configuration are both wellresearched areas. A commonly used approach by researchers is the involvement of a trusted third party (TTP). The primary reason for this involvement is that it solves the conflict of preprogramming a key into the non-volatile memory (NVM) of a target device, as discussed before, with the least impact on security.
The programmed key is then used by core vendors to generate encrypted IPs, which are useable only on the target device (Kean, 2002) . However, the drawback of this approach is that a high degree of trust is put in the TTP as they have access to the key and therefore all IPs. To avoid this, some researchers introduced an additional security layer in the form of a Core Installation Module (CIM) (Guneysu et al., 2007; Maes et al., 2002; Zhang and Chang, 2014; Zhang and Chang, 2015) . These modules are developed by CVs for the decryption of their IPs. They contain another key, which is different from the preprogrammed one and is only known to the CV. The CIM bitstream itself is then delivered to TTPs that encrypt it with the device root key and deliver it to SDs. CIMs typically contain a custom decryption logic. An example CIM is shown in Figure 2 .
Such modules increase security because even if the root key is leaked, adversaries have to reverse engineer a CIM for the extraction of IP specific keys, and only then single IPs can be decrypted. This process has to be repeated for every IP, which makes it an effort beyond financial gain in most cases. Furthermore, cloning of CIMs can be avoided by integrating device identifier checks into its logic.
Kumar et al. (K et al., 2017) proposed to avoid the step of encrypting CIM (Maes et al., 2002) . Their scheme does not require any kind of third party for programming internal keys or encrypting CIMs, hence their scheme can work without the involvement of a TTP. However, their work is based on the assumption that a key cannot be extracted from a plaintext bitstream and thereby completely relies on obscurity introduced by the proprietary file format.
More secure schemes with a reduced TTP dependency are presented in (Guneysu et al., 2007) and (Zhang and Chang, 2015) , where Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange (DHKE) algorithms generate IP specific keys within the device itself during runtime. This way all IP specific keys are ephemeral, and thus TTPs and SDs cannot get access to them by reverse engineering, unlike in previous cases. 
Readback
Despite of possible other limitations, all of previously published schemes suffer from readback attacks. SoC devices have a processing system (PS) as a controlling entity that has full access to the programming logic (PL). The PS can read any previously configured data using the processor configuration access port (PCAP) (Xilinx, 2017b) , and can extract secret information or even IP cores. Non-SoC FPGAs suffers from this attack too, because a user logic can perform readback via the internal configuration access port (ICAP) and deliver the data to an external interface. Any control logic around ICAP for protection against readback can be overwritten using dynamic partial reconfiguration (DPR) and after that, an attack can be performed easily. Readback of an initially encrypted IP is done in (Adetomi et al., 2017) , where it is relocated to another location after initial configuration. (Maes et al., 2002) and (Zhang and Chang, 2014) actually identified readback attacks as a possible threat and concluded that this feature should be disabled. However, it was not made clear that readback can be disabled only for external sources and hence internal logic or running software could still perform such an attack.
Remote Configuration
Remote configuration of IPs relies on the infrastructure of a secure licensing framework and is performed by establishing a connection between CVs and the target devices via a common network such as the Internet. One of the first published approaches in this field proposed delivering bitstreams in an encrypted form over an unsecure channel (Drimer and Kuhn, 2009) . The key has to be pre-programmed by the CV, which causes logistical overhead. Besides, the scheme is also prone to tampering because no bitstream authentication is considered. Furthermore, all IPs are encrypted with the same key, which leads to exposure of all previously transmitted IPs in case of a successful attack. Finally, this scheme again suffers from the key pre-programming conflict described in section 1.
Works that are more recent use asymmetric cryptography and per-session keys (Braeken et al., 2011; Vliegen et al., 2015; Kashyap and Chaves, 2014) . In these schemes, a new key is generated for every session based on a DHKE algorithm. Once a bitstream transfer is completed, they are either configured on the device directly or encrypted using a random key and then stored on the NVM (Kashyap and Chaves, 2014; Kashyap and Chaves, 2016) . Even though the latter approach has advantages like faster reconfiguration time, it is prone to several key extraction attacks because all keys are stored within the programming logic itself. Except (Thanh et al., 2012; Thanh et al., 2013) , none of the proposed work considers SoC-based FPGAs and therefore require the implementation of all functions on the PL, which not only introduces serious overhead but also makes them prone to side-channel attacks (SCA) (Wollinger et al., 2004) . Available solutions, which make use of SoC FPGAs to perform the key agreement tasks in software (Thanh et al., 2012; Thanh et al., 2013) , are limited to using IPs from a single core vendor and do not offer bitstream storage.
Based on the literature review, it is clear that available remote configuration approaches do not work within the context of IP licensing. In some cases, access of SDs to their device is completely blocked (Braeken et al., 2011) or SDs can only use licensed IPs but no logic of their own on the PL (Vliegen et al., 2013; Thanh et al., 2012; Thanh et al., 2013) . We conclude that remote configuration of an IP is not possible in a secure and feasible way with any of the exiting schemes, and a new solution is required which provides the required infrastructure.
SECURE REMOTE CONFIGURATION SCHEME
We propose a new scheme, which aims to overcome the described limitations such as readback and single core vendor restrictions, based on remote configuration for delivering IPs directly to target devices. Before discussing the execution flow of the scheme, basic functional blocks are explained in section 3.1.
Basic Functionality and Security
Bitstream Format
IPs can be delivered in different formats as explained in section 1. Among these formats, RTL and netlist must be processed using vendor tools to generate data that can be configured on the device. Doing that on the fly, inside the device, would require enormous effort and cause time overhead in the magnitude of several hours. On the other hand, bitstream format is ready-to-use blocks that can be configured directly. Hence, we only consider IPs to be delivered in bitstream form.
Layered Rights Management
In SoC devices, typically the CPU acts as system master and has complete control over the system including PL (Xilinx, 2017a; Xilinx, 2017b; Intel, 2018a) . Therefore, both PS and PL need to operate in a secure state at all time to guarantee licensing integrity. This can be achieved by introducing layered rights management, where users are categorized as either privileged or non-privileged (Intel, 2016, p. 159 ). Non-privileged users have restricted control over certain system components while privileged users have full access. In the FPGA market, ARM microprocessors are the de-facto standard when it comes to the CPU part in SoC devices. Through the ARM TrustZone feature, they support layered rights on hardware level, meaning that buses, memories and peripherals can be divided into secure and non-secure components. TrustZone is supported by most SoCbased FPGAs (Intel, 2017b; Intel, 2018a; Gosain and Palanichamy, 2014) . As discussed earlier, the configuration interfaces can be used for readback attacks. TrustZone can be used to counter this attack by restricting non-privileged users' access to interfaces. To achieve this, a hypervisor can be used that hosts a secure and a non-secure operating system (OS). Both, hypervisor and secure OS are running in privileged mode and are not accessible from the outside (i.e. by a user). Meanwhile, the non-secure OS runs in a non-privileged mode with restricted capabilities. It can access secure resources via secure OS and non-secure resources directly. This trusted execution environment protects security-critical software, firmware and hardware components, while not restricting SDs to a set of predefined APIs (Sabt and Achemlal, 2015) .
In a similar fashion, the PL can be divided into secure and non-secure sections, as depicted in Figure  3 . The secure section should include a controlling interface that restricts ICAP usage to authorized commands only. Unauthorized commands, such as modification and/or readback of secure sections and/or IPs, are blocked by this circuit. 
Bitstream Analysis
Applications running on the non-secure OS must have the capability to perform configuration of IPs and custom logic using software, so SDs can configure their own design. Therefore, an API with this capability will be provided to non-privileged users. However, for security against unauthorized configuration and readback, bitstream analysis is required. It can be achieved by analysing the bitstream's frame addresses (FAs) which represent the target locations in the PL. The FAs are compared against a table stored in the secure OS that defines secure, non-secure, custom logic or IP locations.
Secure Boot
After shipment, devices are in possession of SDs and fully under their control. However, a malicious SD would benefit greatly from breaking device security, as this would allow them to clone IPs at will instead of paying licensing fees. Consequently, SDs must be treated as potential attackers and critical components must be secured against attacks based on physical access. For this purpose, the "secure boot" feature is used, which is typically supported by modern FPGAs (Intel, 2018c; Sanders, 2015) . Secure boot means that the complete boot chain, from loading the FSBL to loading the secure OS, is encrypted and authenticated using asymmetric cryptography. The corresponding key and authentication certificate is pre-programmed in the device before distribution. At start-up, the device only decrypts an authenticated boot loader with the previously programmed key, which in turn contains the key for the next boot stage, e.g. the hypervisor, and so on. With setting up devices to perform secure boots only (Xilinx, 2017a, p. 288; Intel 2017a, p. 35) , it can be guaranteed that no unauthorized software runs on the device outside the control of the hypervisor.
Enabling Remote Configuration
Remote configuration is the establishment of a network connection between a CV and a device, which is used to configure the bitstream directly on this device. The network connection must be secure, so that threats like man-in-the-middle attacks can be avoided. For this purpose, a protocol like Transport Layer Security (TLS) including key exchange and authentication can be used. Additionally, the bitstream itself can be encrypted, too, but then the required key needs to either be agreed upon or sent via a secure channel, which would create more problems. We are focusing on the delivery of unencrypted bitstreams using a secure channel. Since bitstream sizes are in the range of several megabytes for modern devices, they cannot be stored in on-chip memory, which typically has a capacity of a few hundred kilobytes. Storing them off-chip on the other hand makes them vulnerable to bus probing and cold boot attacks. As described in section 3.1.2, the ARM TrustZone feature can be used to counter this type of attack. In the secure OS, a software module needs to be implemented which encrypts the bitstream with a random key on the fly. This key can either be stored in another secure software module (Software key-vault), a hardware secure key storage component or the secure section of the PL. Before encrypting the IPs for storage, they are checked for unauthorized commands through bitstream analysis, as explained in section 3.1.3. Finally, IPs can be configured using PCAP. The entire flow is shown in Figure 4 .
Target Hardware
The proposed scheme can be implemented on most available devices as long as they support dynamic partial reconfiguration (DPR), an internal decryption engine and a secure key vault. This includes most devices from Xilinx and Intel and therefore a major share of the SRAM-based FPGA market. Optimally, a processing system is present on the device that handles remote communication, bitstream configuration and layered rights management. Such SoC-FPGAs can be found on many modern devices from low-cost to absolute high-end. Nevertheless, this solution also works with non SoC-based FPGAs by configuring a PS soft core on the PL as it has been done in related publications (Vliegen et al., 2015) . However, there will be significant resource overhead.
Execution Flow and Implementation
The proposed scheme is implemented on a Xilinx Zynq UltraScale+ (EK-U1-ZCU102-G), which is a SoC-type device supporting all required features. The scheme execution on this device begins with booting it into a secure state. First, the Power Management Unit (PMU) boots, powers all required components and performs an integrity check on the subsequent Configuration Security Unit (CSU) firmware. Afterwards, control is passed to the CSU, which sets security levels authenticates and decrypts a First Stage Boot Loader (FSBL). It then hands over control to the PS while it continues to run in the background where it provides cryptographic accelerators, key management and PCAP access. The PS then executes the decrypted FSBL, which initializes necessary components like buses and organizes security states of system resources based on ARM TrustZone. Finally, it authenticates and decrypts the next boot stage, which could either be a hypervisor or another boot loader stage. In favour of maintainability and portability, we chose the latter approach and load a Second Stage Boot Loader (SSBL), which is then used to initialize the hypervisor, while the FSBL only focuses on system security initialization. Xen is used as hypervisor, which is open source and available free of charge (xenproject.org, 2018). It builds on top of TrustZone and supports devices from both Xilinx and Intel. It acts as a control and communication monitor for a secure and a non-secure OS (User OS). Any OS can be chosen for either category, however, for the given implementation we chose "FreeRTOS" as secure OS since it is lightweight, supports the necessary communication features and devices from both Xilinx and Intel (freertos.com, 2018) . In addition, Xilinx' Petalinux is used to create a non-secure user OS. It comes with many drivers, has official tool support and therefore allows a fast and reliable scheme evaluation. At this stage, the processing system is fully booted and the PL can be configured. To expand the secure state to the programmable logic, an initial (full) bitstream is loaded that includes secure logic, i.e. for ICAP control, and interconnects for SD and CV designs. Once the initial bitstream is configured, additional logic can be loaded. When initiating the configuration of an SD's custom design using the corresponding APIs, its bitstream is first passed to the Bitstream Analysis module, which ensures it does not contain any unauthorized commands, e.g. writes to a secure section. Finally, the bitstream is configured to a corresponding slot by the Configuration Manager module.
For requesting and configuring an IP from a CV, a similar API is defined in the secure OS. The full flow is shown in Figure 4 . First, to download an IP, a secure remote communication channel to the CV's server is established using the Remote Access module. This request is only granted if a valid license was bought for the respective device. Device identification in this case is done by using the unique 96-bit serial number that is available on the Xilinx Zynq UltraScale+. Once an IP is downloaded, it passes the same process of bitstream analysis and configuration as for a custom design. Configuration times in both cases will be significantly shorter than for the initial bitstream.
SECURITY ANALYSIS
Security of the proposed work is provided by a trust chain based on pre-programmed keys and certificates in the device. A TTP performs this preprogramming; hence, our scheme also relies on a TTP. Since FPGA vendors produce the devices, it would be straightforward for them to take the role of the TTP and program keys before distributing the devices. In addition, they would also be responsible for publishing the matching software, i.e. boot loader, hypervisor and secure OS. Since trust is already placed by using their devices, no further trust dependencies would be introduced. All cryptographic primitives used in the scheme, i.e. AES and RSA, are considered computationally secure. Furthermore, these algorithms are recommended for long-term security by government-funded organizations (German Federal Office for Information Security, 2018; US National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2001) . Nevertheless, some successful side channel attacks like differential power analysis have been conducted on older devices before, e.g. Xilinx' Virtex-II/4/5 series (Moradi et al., 2011a; Moradi et al., 2011b) and on PS (Ramsay, 2017) . However, even if an attack were successful in extracting the AES device key, it would not be sufficient to boot a tampered OS, as any boot software also needs to be authenticated, and the required private certificate never leaves the TTP. Thus, it cannot be extracted from the device. One possible attack vector would be to decrypt the boot loader using the retrieved AES key, then extract the key for decrypting the hypervisor from the plaintext boot loader, again use this to decrypt the hypervisor and finally extract the key for the secure OS. Once the secure OS is available in plaintext, the private certificate for establishing a secure communication channel with CVs can be extracted from it and used to spoof the device during communication. Several approaches to prevent this attack scenario are currently analysed and will be implemented in the future, for instance a run-time calculated identifier could be sent along with the certificate. This identifier could be a hash of specific sections of the secure on-chip memory. However, attacking the secure boot chain is highly complicated and further requires extracting the AES root key from a device's hardware key vault in the first place, which is highly unlikely on modern devices. Furthermore, if successful, this attack would only affect a single device and the effort for applying it to other devices stays constant. Therefore, we consider it a minor threat only. When such a security breach is identified, CVs can add the device ID and certificate to a black list, which means all future requests for these devices will be declined.
Since this scheme relies on a trusted execution environment, we also consider the security of the implementation at hand, i.e. ARM TrustZone. So far, very few successful attacks have been published. One of them is the Rowhammer attack, where secure areas of DDR memory are accessed by a non-secure system master (Carru, 2017) . In this attack, neighbouring rows of memory cells are rapidly accessed, which causes bit flips in the secure memory cells. However, not only is the complexity of this attack very high, as it requires inside knowledge of the secure memory mapping, but it can also be countered by simply keeping secure memory rows consecutive or by using the on-chip memory for secret data instead of DDR.
Another attack monitors cache access behaviour to extract secrets of an application (Zhang et al., 2016) . It is executed by filling the cache with data of a non-secure application and then triggering a secure application. Thus, the secure application's data will be cached during its execution, which will replace previously cached data. After this, the non-secure application data is read again. By measuring memory access times, an attacker can get information on data access patterns of the secure application. If the attacker furthermore has detailed knowledge of the secure application, he can predict certain secrets like keys from this information. Again, this kind of attack requires detailed system knowledge and is hence highly unlikely. A possible countermeasure would be to restrict cache to secure OS only, though this would significantly slow down the non-secure OS. Consequently, this measure should only be applied for very high security systems, which perform sensitive cryptographic tasks like AES encryption and where the used algorithm is publicly available. For common usecases, this attack scenario can be ignored.
Overall, we believe that the security of the presented scheme is sufficient with minimal attack surface exposed and any known attack will only work in a specialised environment such as a laboratory.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed an IP licensing framework with the capability of remotely configuring devices. An intellectual property design, in a proprietary obfuscated format, is delivered from CVs to the device directly using a secure channel, while the device itself runs in a secure execution environment. In addition, an extensive security analysis of previous as well as the proposed scheme is presented, and it is shown that this scheme is secure, least restrictive for SDs in term of device resource usage and has no resource overhead. This is a work-in-progress, and feasibility and security will be further improved, as described throughout the paper.
A flow based on this scheme will provide extra guarantees against IP theft; this could get more CVs invested, which we believe can increase growth in the IP licensing market.
